Denver Law Review
Volume 53
Issue 1 Tenth Circuit Surveys

Article 18

January 1976

Patents, Trademarks, Copyrights, and Unfair Competition
Robert Dorr
Donald M. Duft
Cheryl Hodgson

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr

Recommended Citation
Robert Dorr, Donald M. Duft & Cheryl Hodgson, Patents, Trademarks, Copyrights, and Unfair Competition,
53 Denv. L.J. 247 (1976).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, COPYRIGHTS,
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
OVERVIEW
By

ROBERT DORR,* DONALD

M. DuFf,** and

CHERYL HODGSON

The Tenth Circuit considered five cases on appeal this term
involving patents, copyrights, and unfair competition. There
were no cases involving trademarks. First, in Eggenhofer v.
Koury,' the court remanded Eggenhofer's appeal from the denial
of a preliminary injunction to the district court for a written
statement of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Eggenhofer,
a well-known western artist, sought to enjoin the appellees from
advertising and publishing a book entitled Eggenhofer: The Pulp
Years. The district court found from the evidence presented that
Eggenhofer suffered no irreparable harm. The Tenth Circuit inquired why Eggenhofer did not argue infringement of his common
law copyright rights, which, once established, requires no showing
of irreparable harm in order to warrant injunctive relief. Rather,
Eggenhofer had argued a contractual breach in the publishing
contract and a tortious compromise of his name. Unfortunately,
the district court had not written an opinion, and, because the
record presented no means of ascertaining the true basis of the
district court's denial of injunctive relief, the Tenth Circuit remanded.
In Maloney-Crawford Tank Corp. v. Sauder Tank Co.,2 the
Tenth Circuit refused to disturb the trial court's award of damages, interest from the date of judgment, and denial of an award
of attorney's fees. The Tenth Circuit reiterated its position that
attorney's fees are awarded in patent cases only in "exceptional
cases" and not as a "matter of law."
* Associate, Burton, Crandell & Polumbus, Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Firm;
B.S., 1968, Milwaukee School of Engineering; M.S., 1970, Northwestern University; J.D.,
1974, University of Denver.
** Patent Attorney, Boulder, Colorado; B.S., 1949, Illinois Institute of Technology;
LL.B., 1953, New York University; LL.M., 1971, New York University.
***
B.A., 1972, Louisiana Tech University; J.D., 1976, University of Denver.
No. 73-1926 (10th Cir., Sept. 24, 1974) (Not for Routine Publication).
511 F.2d 10, 185 U.S.P.Q. 80 (10th Cir. 1975).
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In Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp. the Tenth Circuit, in a lengthy
opinion, upheld IBM's counterclaim of trade secret theft. Telex
was found to have lured key employees from IBM. Telex was,
thus, able immediately to penetrate the marketplace with a competing product, completely bypassing the research and development stage. The Tenth Circuit upheld the award to IBM of (1)
$4.5 million representing lost IBM monthly rentals, (2) $3 million
representing replaced IBM units, and (3) $10 million representing
the savings to Telex from bypassing the research and development stage. The Tenth Circuit, however, found the following
awards to IBM to be too speculative: (1) $3 million for increased
security costs and (2) $400,000 for increased manufacturing costs.
The further award to IBM of $1 million in punitive damages was
upheld. Both sides have now settled this case, with no damages
being due to either side.
Finally, since last term's decision in Moore v. Schultz,I the
Tenth Circuit has had occasion to reaffirm its position on the
non-obviousness requirements of patentability in Price v. Lake
Sales Supply R. M., Inc.5 and Halliburton Co. v. Dow Chemical
Co.6 The following comment examines the sequence of events
since Moore in light of the firm stance to which the Tenth Circuit
has adhered regarding non-obviousness determinations despite a
strong dissent by Mr. Justice Douglas in the Supreme Court's
denial of certiorari in Moore.7
3 510 F.2d 894,
case, see Norgaard,
(1976).
1 491 F.2d 294,
385 (1974).
5 510 F.2d 388,
9 514 F.2d 377,
7 419 U.S. 930,

184 U.S.P.Q. 521 (10th Cir. 1975). For an extended analysis of this
Relevant Market in Computer Monopolization, 53 DENVER L.J. 180 U.S.P.Q. 548 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 930, 183 U.S.P.Q.
183 U.S.P.Q. 519 (10th Cir. 1974).
185 U.S.P.Q. 769 (10th Cir. 1975).
183 U.S.P.Q. 385 (1974).
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PATENT LAW-NON-OBIOUSNESS-QUESTION

OF LAW

OR QUESTION OF FACT?

Moore v. Schultz, 491 F.2d 294, 180 U.S.P.Q. 584
(10th Cir. 1974)
Halliburton Co. v. Dow Chemical Co., 514 F.2d
377, 185 U.S.P.Q. 769 (10th Cir. 1975)
INTRODUCTION

The culmination of a recent scenario of three cases dealing
with the question of non-obviousness (one of three requirements
for granting a patent) leaves the Tenth Circuit standing alone in
its view that the question of non-obviousness includes factual
determinations which may be made by a jury, with the court
deciding as a matter of law whether or not non-obviousness is
present.
The importance of this position becomes critical as, under
rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, such facfactual findings by the jury will not be overturned unless "clearly
erroneous." The prevailing view in other circuits deems the elements of non-obviousness a question of law in toto, effectuating
a de novo standard upon appellate review. Despite its unique
position, the Tenth Circuit has adopted a view of patent law more
consistent with the traditional role of a jury in the American
system of justice.
The trio of cases began in January 1974 with Moore v.
Schultz,' wherein the court reaffirmed its position that "within
the Tenth Circuit, novelty, utility and non-obviousness are held
to require factual determinations." 9 Schultz applied to the
United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. Pending the
Court's decision as to whether certiorari should be granted in
Moore, the Tenth Circuit reiterated its position in Price v. Lake
Sales Supply R. M., Inc., ,0 although no jury was involved there.
Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court denied certiorari for
Moore, but Mr. Justice Douglas rendered a scathing dissenting
opinion in complete derogation of the Tenth Circuit position.
491 F.2d 294, 180 U.S.P.Q. 548 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 930, 183 U.S.P.Q.
385 (1974).
Id. at 300, 180 U.S.P.Q. at 552.
" 510 F.2d 388, 183 U.S.P.Q. 519 (10th Cir. 1974).
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Despite Mr. Justice Douglas' dissent, the Tenth Circuit once
again adhered to its position regarding non-obviousness in Halliburton Co. v. Dow Chemical Co." It seems that the Tenth Circuit
presents the better view on non-obviousness, contrary to Justice
Douglas' views and the weight of other federal circuits. In order
to best understand the current importance of non-obviousness in
the role of patent validity, however, a brief background discussion
is necessary.
I.

THE THREE HURDLES TO A VALID PATIENT

An inventor of a successful product is often frustrated to find
that he has three hurdles to overcome in receiving a truly valid
and enforceable patent. The first hurdle occurs in the Patent and
Trademark Office where, for a period often greater than 2 years,
an inventor vies with an examiner, who determines whether or
not the invention is entitled to a patent. The examiner is an
expert in the area of art in which the invention lies; although he
exercises discretion, he must adhere to certain statutory requirement set forth in the Patent Act." These requirements embrace
the following three areas: (1) Novelty;' 3 (2) usefulness; 4 and (3)
non-obviousness. '5
A patent cannot be obtained if the submission lacks novelty,
i.e., if it is identical to a prior art. "Prior art" may be defined as
certain statutorily defined categories, or types, of knowledge or
acts which predate the invention or the application. Such prior
art categories include patents of any country, printed publications throughout the world, and a public use or sale in this country by anyone, including the inventor, more than 1 year prior to
the application filing date.
Additionally, the item patented must serve some useful function. Finally, the Patent Act mandates that a patent may not be
obtained if
the differences between the subject matter sought to.be patented
and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would
514 F.2d 377, 185 U.S.P.Q. 769 (10th Cir. 1975).
12

13
"

35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1970) [hereinafter cited as the Patent Act].
Id. § 102.
Id. § 101.
I5
Id. § 103.
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have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter
pertains."1

The elements necessary for a finding of non-obviousness are, in
other words, that the invention (1) was not obvious, (2) at the
time of the invention, (3) to one having ordinary skill in the art.
In addition to applying this test of non-obviousness, the courts
have asked the following questions: (1) Was a long-felt demand
for the subject matter satisfied? 7 (2) Did the marketplace make
rapid use of the subject matter? 8 (3) Did the commercial success
of the invention stem from the nature of the device itself or did
it result from such factors as low price or extensive advertising? 9
In Graham v. John Deere Co., 2 the Supreme Court held that
the existence of non-obviousness is a question of fact, and that
section 103 permits a practical test of patentability that is functional in approach to questions of invention. 2 ' The Court held
that the examiner must be persuaded during the prosecution of
the application that the submission is not merely an obvious
improvement to the prior art. The examiner must evaluate the
prior art, not at the time of the prosecution of the application, but
rather at the time the invention was made.
If the examiner is persuaded, the inventor receives a patent
which, in effect, provides a constitutionally protected monopoly
for 17 years. This presumably prevents others from making,
using, or selling his device. If the inventor is more fortunate than
most and has a commercially successful product, he will often be
faced with a second hurdle: He will be required to defend the
validity of his patent when a competitor copies his invention and
exploits it commercially. At this juncture, the inventor may sue
for infringement of his patent, or, after receiving a letter from the
inventor threatening to sue, the competitor may effectuate an
action for declaratory judgment to have the patent declared invalid.
'
"

Id. (emphasis added).
Otto v. Koppers Co., 246 F.2d 789, 114 U.S.P.Q. 188 (4th Cir. 1957), cert. denied,

355 U.S. 939, 116 U.S.P.Q. 602 (1958).
Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45 (1923).
Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc. v. Kollsman Inst. Corp., 372 F.2d 263, 152 U.S.P.Q. 446
(2d Cir. 1967).
20 383 U.S. 1, 148 U.S.P.Q. 459 (1966).
21 Id. at 17, 148 U.S.P.Q. at 466-67.
"
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It is by no means certain that the inventor can successfully
overcome the second hurdle. During the 20-year period from 1953
to 1972, 15,127 patent cases were commenced, of which 2,131
reached trial." In these cases, 38.2 percent of the patents were
held valid, 53.3 percent were held invalid, and in 8.5 percent the
validity of the patent was not decided. During that same 20-year
period, 1,074,538 patents were issued. Thus, just over 0.2 percent
were adjudicated in the district courts.
An inventor who overcomes the second hurdle and is successful in the district court encounters a third hurdle upon appeal by
the infringer to the circuit court. During the same 20-year span,
decisions involving 1,232 patents, or just over 0.1 percent of all
patents issued during that 20-year period, were appealed. The
circuit courts have held 34.6 percent of these appealed patents
valid with 65.4 percent being held invalid.
Most findings of patent invalidity in both the district court
and the circuit court are based on non-obviousness. Using the
non-obviousness standard, the courts have consistently held in3
valid approximately 60 percent of all patents litigated.
Clearly, the non-obviousness standard is a most difficult test
for the inventor to overcome. A heavy burden is placed on the
inventor, as he must prove the level of skill or knowledge of a
fictitious "ordinary person skilled in the art," who is presumed
by law to have knowledge of all prior art. Without doubt, 2this
4
ordinary person is quite an exceptional non-ordinary person.
22 The following patent statistics utilized in this and following paragraphs were taken
from Gloria K. Koenig's excellent treatise, PATENT INVALIDITY (1974). For the analysis of
patents over the past 20 years, see id. § 4.02, Table 17 at 4-32.
23 See Horn & Epstein, The Federal Courts' View of Patents-aDifferent View, 55 J.

PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 134, 139 (1973).
24

See Leonard, The Man Skilled in the Art-or-Goodness Gracious, A Ghost!, 56

J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 599 (1974).

The lithe and ageless phantom of the "man skilled in the art" makes it
quite difficult for the Attorney to know what course to follow in supporting
arguments before or after a final rejection. How does one attack a fictitious
presence, who is endowed with fictitious knowledge and employs his fictitious knowledge in a fictitious manner and, by fictitious reasoning from this
fictitious knowledge, creates a fictitious concept, and derives therefrom a
fictitious and wholly synthetic reduction to practice.
It is time, therefore, that this phantom, a most distracting chimera, born
out of Deficiency and sired by Doubt, should be relegated promptly and
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Presumably, the patent examiner, who has experience and
expertise in his area of art, should qualify as an "ordinary person
skilled in that art." It seems that when this standard is applied
to a litigated patent, the courts rarely would have the background, skill, and expertise to be such "ordinary person[s]
skilled in the art." That the standard of invention varies widely
in the different federal circuits is indicative of the courts' struggle
to apply this standard. For example, for the period from 1968 to
1972, the Second and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals held less
than 25 percent of the patents valid. 5 The First, Third, Fourth,
and Ninth Circuits held less than 35 percent valid, while the
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits held approximately 50
percent valid.
From these statistics and the resulting awareness of the high
mortality rate of all patents issued, it is clear that the method of
determining obviousness is crucial to a litigant's ability to sustain
or overturn a verdict upon appeal. From an examination of the
Tenth Circuit's position, one may see why the "clearly erroneous"
standard upon review is favorable to a successful claimant. The
authors herald the Tenth Circuit's stance as that best reflecting
the intent of Congress and the more rational means of
determining obviousness.
II.

A.

THE TENTH CIRCUIT VIEW OF NON-OBVIOUSNESS

Halliburton and Moore

The recent Tenth Circuit decision in Halliburtoninvolved an
action for declaratory judgment brought by the plaintiff-appellee,
Halliburton Co., who claimed invalidity and non-infringement
of a patent owned by the defendant-appellant, Dow Chemical
Co., who counterclaimed for infringement. Dow appealed from
the district court's holding of a patent invalid and its award of
attorney's fees to Halliburton.
The Dow patent pertained to a one-step process for cleaning,
within a 6-hour period, more than a ton of oxide scale from large
boilers used for steam generation of electricity. The prior art propermanently to the Elysian Fields of long discredited myths by the simple
step of admitting that the peculiar ability and knowledge attributed to him
are, in the end, only the personal beliefs of the tribunal itself.
Id. at 603-04.
1 KoENIG, supra note 22, at App.-172.
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cess required several days and many steps. The downtime of such
a boiler costs more than $40,000 per day due to the necessity of
securing electricity from other sources during that period. The
Dow patent was a vast improvement over the prior method in
terms of time and expense. The Tenth Circuit, with Judge Breitenstein writing the majority opinion, upheld the district court as
to patent invalidity, but reversed the award of attorney's fees.
In Halliburton the circuit court followed its prior ruling in
Moore v. Schultz,2" in which Judge Seth emphatically held the
obviousness tests of Graham v. John Deere Co." to be issues of
fact that are to be determined by the jury. Thus, Moore separated
the Tenth Circuit from the Fourth, 8 Fifth,2 9 Sixth,30 Seventh,"
and Ninth12 Circuits. The Tenth Circuit in Moore stated:
The Supreme Court has observed that this matter "lends itself to
several basic factual inquiries" and compared it in that respect to
concepts of negligence and scienter ....

Although the Fifth and

Ninth Circuits have taken a different view, we have held those observations to mean that non-obviousness is itself a factual question. .

.

. Thus, within the Tenth Circuit, novelty, utility, and non-

obviousness are held to require factual determinations.3

Judge Seth further stated, however, that "it is clear 3that the
ultimate question of validity of a patent is one of law." '
B.

A Critical Analysis of Justice Douglas' Views

Subsequent to Judge Seth's opinion in Moore, Mr. Justice
Douglas had occasion to interpose his comments upon denial of
2-491 F.2d 294, 180 U.S.P.Q. 548 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 930, 183 U.S.P.Q.
385 (1974).
27 383 U.S. 1, 148 U.S.P.Q. 459 (1966). See text accompanying note 20 supra.
2' Tights, Inc. v. Stanley, 441 F.2d 336, 169 U.S.P.Q. 578 (4th Cir. 1971).

11Swofford v. B & W, Inc., 395 F.2d 362, 158 U.S.P.Q. 72 (5th Cir. 1968).

11Deyerle v. Wright Mfg. Co., 496 F.2d 45, 181 U.S.P.Q. 685 (6th Cir. 1974); contra
Hieger v. Ford Motor Co., 516 F.2d 1324, 186 U.S.P.Q. 374 (6th Cir. 1975).
11Gettelman Mfg., Inc. v. Lawn 'N' Sport Power Mower Sales & Serv., Inc., 517 F.2d
1194, 186 U.S.P.Q. 376 (7th Cir. 1975). Senior District Judge Jameson severely criticized
the majority by stating:
In resolving the obviousness issue the district court considered the three
basic factual inquiries outlined in Graham. The findings of fact made by the
district court with respect to those inquiries may not be overturned unless
clearly erroneous.
Id. at 1200, 186 U.S.P.Q. at 380.
12 Hensley Equip. Co. v. Esco Corp., 375 F.2d 432, 152 U.S.P.Q. 781 (9th Cir. 1967).
11 491 F.2d at 300, 180 U.S.P.Q. at 552 (citations omitted).
34 Id.
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certiorari by the Supreme Court. 5 Mr. Justice Douglas dissented
and argued that an obviousness determination is a question of law
for the court to decide. The essential points of his dissent are
summarized below:
(1) Article 1, section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution authorizes Congress to provide for the granting of patents.
This clause was written "against the back-drop of
abuses by the Crown in granting monopolies;" the
framers of the Constitution did not intend these exclusive rights to be granted freely.
(2) Supreme Court cases characterizing the correct
standard of invention are now embodied in section 103
of the Patent Act, which requires non-obvious subject
matter. A court is required in every patent infringement
suit to enforce obedience to this constitutional standard. Such cannot be delegated to the jury "on the supposition that only a question of fact is involved."3 7
(3) The determination whether a patentee's contribution justifies the patent monopoly requires "reasoned
elaboration" and, therefore, "treatment as a question of
38
law.'
(4) "Findings that identify the unique features of the
patented device and explain why they advance the art
are essential, to permit appellate review to insure that
constitutional limitations have not been exceeded. The
responsibility belongs to the courts. It will not do to
leave such matters to unarticulated resolution by the
jury.

' 39

(5) "The decision below holding patentability a question of fact for the jury represents an abdication which
is likely to produce haphazard application of the statutory and constitutional standard."4 0
The Douglas dissent reads well on the surface. However, a

critical analysis indicates that the reasoning and arguments used
" 419 U.S. 930, 183 U.S.P.Q. 385 (1974).

N Id. at 930-31, 183 U.S.P.Q. at 385.
" Id. at 931, 183 U.S.P.Q. at 385.
Id. at 932, 183 U.S.P.Q. at 385.
Id.

0 4Id.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 53

by Mr. Justice Douglas are not unassailable, as matters either of
law or of common sense.
1. The Commerce Clause or Article I, Section 8, Clause 8?
Relying upon article I, section 8, clause 8, the patent and
copyright clause of the Constitution, Justice Douglas first asserted that a patent is justified only if it "makes a distinctive
contribution to the advancement of scientific knowledge."' By
such terms, Douglas demanded an extremely high standard of
invention as a constitutional necessity. He stated that this is "a
constitutional restraint on the dispensation of patents."4 Such
statements have been made often in recent years, and, unless
they are challenged in the near future, they will probably become
the law of the land by way of default.
Certainly, the prerogative of the Court includes the right to
set a high standard of invention so long as the Patent Act is based
on the patent and copyright clause of the Constitution. However,
no reason is seen why Congress could not authorize the granting
of patents based on its powers under the commerce clause. Congress in recent years has relied upon the commerce clause to
affect many activities of every day life. Specifically, Congress
could set the level of invention, even if very low, that it considers
appropriate for the granting of patents. 3
2.

Law or Fact?

Douglas' third point was that the requisite "reasoned elaboration" in determining the grant of a patent also mandates treatment of the same "as a question of law." 44 That argument is not
self-proving and, in fact, is open to serious question. Arguably,
Congress, in enacting section 103 of the Patent Act, provided a
constitutionally acceptable test whereby a jury may determine
obviousness by answering questions of fact. One can respond to
specific interrogatories and articulate why an invention is or is
not obvious-at the time the invention was made-to one having
ordinary skill in the art. This function can be performed by the
" Id. at 930, 183 U.S.P.Q. at 385.
42

Id.

41A similar position has been advocated by Professor Nimmer regarding copyright
legislation. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 9.1 at 27 (Supp. 1972).
" 419 U.S. at 932, 183 U.S.P.Q. at 385.
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jury listening to expert testimony including testimony characterizing what the ordinary skill in the art is. These factual questions
may be submitted to a jury; the court can then take the jury's
factual determinations regarding the three-part question posed
by section 103 and hold the patent to be valid or invalid, as the
case may be. This line of reasoning is submitted to be as fully
persuasive as Justice Douglas' unproven assertion that a case
cannot be delegated to the jury when a question of law is involved.
3.

Nonarticulation or Jury?

Douglas' fourth point, the statement that it will not do to
leave such matters "to unarticulated resolution by the jury,"45 is
also open to serious question. Unfortunately, Mr. Douglas did not
make clear to what he was objecting. Was he objecting to the
nonarticulation of the jury's decision per se, or was he objecting
to the fact that the question of obviousness had been left to the
jury to begin with? If he merely desired improved articulation,
this could easily be accomplished by having the court submit
special charges requiring the jury to specify: (1) The unique features of the patented device, and (2) explanations as to why the
advance in the art is not obvious. Such charges should satisfy Mr.
Douglas in the event that his only objection was to nonarticulation. On the other hand, if Justice Douglas were dissatisfied with
the fact that juries are permitted to determine such questions, no
matter how eloquent their articulation, then he should have so
stated.
4.

Haphazard or Lacking Uniformity?

With respect to the fifth point, the merits of Justice Douglas'
arguments again are questionable. He stated that "holding
patentability a question of fact for the jury represents an abdication which is likely to produce haphazard application of the statutory and constitutional standard.""
This objection fails in the absence of a showing that jury
decisions in patent cases are any more "haphazard" than they are
in any other type of case. Certainly, the defendant in a criminal
case is as concerned over "haphazard" jury decisions as are the

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 53

parties of a patent suit; yet the authors can recall no instance in
which Justice Douglas has complained of "haphazard" results
from jury decisions in criminal cases.
If by "haphazard" Mr. Douglas meant that the decisions of
different juries are not uniform, he is correct. Admittedly, no two
juries will always decide the same set of facts identically. This is
true in patent cases as well as in other types of cases. However,
this does not render their decisions constitutionally haphazard.
The same observation may be made of trials without juries. Are
the decisions of the courts haphazard if they are not in monolithic
uniformity? Obviously, there is nothing constitutionally haphazard about a jury decision as long as the required instructions are
put to the jury to decide the facts in issue, so that the court can
take the jury's findings and decide the proper issues of law involved.
As a matter of practicality and common sense, it is submitted jurors are fully as capable as courts to determine questions
of obviousness. The members of a jury may not be specialists in
the field of art to which the invention pertains, but neither are
most judges. Further, a judge is neither intrinsically, nor by training, more qualified than a jury to decide the technical issues
required in patent cases.
If Justice Douglas was concerned with the skill of the person
or persons making determinations of obviousness, then the compelling conclusion is that the ideal jury or the ideal arbiter of the
issues would be either patent attorneys or scientists skilled in a
particular art. Alternatively, a national court to try patent cases,
comparable to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals perhaps would satisfy those who argue that the questions of obviousness are so complex in patent cases that they cannot be left
to the "unarticulated" opinions of juries, but rather should be
decided by federal judges who, for some reason, are thought to
be more capable of making such determinations.
5.

What of Section 103?

A more fundamental criticism of the Douglas dissent is that
it avoids any reliance on section 103 of the Patent Act in resolving
whether obviousness is a question of fact or law. This section
specifies that obviousness is to be determined by "a person having ordinary skill in the art" to which the invention pertains. Any
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serious discussion of the method of determining obviousness is
meaningless without reference to the source of this requirement.
Since the statute explicitly requires that this determination
be made by "a person having ordinary skill in the art," it would
appear:
(1) That the language does not exclusively vest the
powers of determination with federal judges unless one
reaches a prior conclusion that they, and they alone, are
the only ones who can be said to be "ordinary persons
skilled in the art;"
(2) that Congress could have specified federal
judges in section 103 if it had so intended;
(3) that since Congress did not mention federal
judges in section 103, there was no intention to limit to
them the rights of determination. Therefore, this right
of determination can be given to others, including
juries;
(4) that since juries cannot decide questions of law,
a determination of obviousness includes a question of
fact.
CONCLUSION

It is maintained that Judge Seth's opinion in Moore presents
a better treatment of non-obviousness than that espoused by Mr.
Justice Douglas. Certainly, during the course of a trial by jury or
by judge, expert witnesses can be called and testimony can be
entered into the record to establish the level of skill which would
be possessed by one with ordinary skill in the art. An analogous
procedure occurs routinely in negligence cases where, rather than
applying the reasonable person standard, a jury must determine
the duty of care imposed on one having special skills. In such
cases, the jury can articulate judgments concerning the duty of
such skilled persons based on the evidence and testimony. It
seems that in cases like Moore, if special interrogatories are submitted to the jury covering the three tests established in Graham
v. John Deere Co.," then patent validity or invalidity can be
decided as a matter of law. Determinations of fact should properly be overturned by an appellate court only if such findings of

260
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fact are "clearly erroneous" under rule 52(a).
Judge Breitenstein in Halliburtonreiterated the Moore view
by stating that "the findings of the issue of obviousness are entitled to the usual respect accorded determinations of fact. . . .An
appellate court does not try factual issues de novo. The clearly
erroneous rule applies."4 Thus, in the Tenth Circuit, the inventor
actually has only two hurdles to overcome in pursuing a constitutionally valid patent. The third level of a de novo situation in the
appellate court has been eliminated.
,1514 F.2d at 379, 185 U.S.P.Q. at 770-71 (citations omitted).

